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is negatively related to ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty, whereas among government-controlled 
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taking preference of government-controlled listed companies is greater among those 
ﬁrms with fewer investment opportunities. Finally, among ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms, 
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1 For example, in 2006, the realized proﬁt of all enterprises in China was RMB 1,200 billion, of which two-
thirds came from companies controlled by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC). Data source: www.sasac.gov.cn.
1. Introduction
Throughout history, governments around the world have been involved in 
production and commerce. For instance, state ownership of mills and metal working 
was common in the ancient Near East (Sobel, 1999), while during the Qing Dynasty 
in China, government monopolized the salt and iron trades. Since the 1980s, starting 
with the Thatcher government in Britain, there has been a worldwide trend toward 
privatization, with government seeming to gradually withdraw from involvement in 
production and commercial activities. However, after the subprime mortgage crisis 
in the United States in August 2008, many countries launched stimulus programs to 
prevent economic recession. As a result, the degree of government intervention in the 
economy increased. In the United States, for example, government nationalized the 
mortgage giants, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the 
Federal Home Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and arranged a rescue package for 
American International Group, Inc. (AIG), the country’s biggest insurance company. In 
addition, the US government became the largest shareholder of General Motors after 
its reorganization. In China, a market economy has developed following the promotion 
of the open door policy and launch of economic reforms in 1978. However, the state-
owned sector remains the mainstay of the nation’s economy.1 
The role of government control has been investigated by a great array of studies. 
Various theories have been put forward to explain the existence of government control 
(for a survey, see Mao, 2007), while the debate on the relative eﬃciency of state and 
private ownership is never ending (Shirley and Walsh, 2000). The privatization wave in 
the 1980s led to a surge in research into privatization and its economic consequences 
(Megginson and Netter, 2001), and in recent years, the examination of political 
connections has become increasingly popular.
China’s unique marketization process has been remarkably successful. The eﬃciency 
of government control and related governance problems in China are much discussed 
among academics and policy makers. Many studies have investigated the impact of the 
type of ownership and ownership structure on ﬁrm performance (eg, Sun and Tong, 
2003; Wei, Xie, and Zhang, 2005; Chen, Firth, and Xu, 2009), and there is increasing 
research interest in the inﬂuence of government control on ﬁrm behavior and corporate 
governance mechanisms (eg, Li, 2002; Chen, Chen, and Wan, 2005). However, there 
is no consensus to date on whether or not government involvement in production 
and commerce promotes firm efficiency. Hence, this paper investigates the influence 
of government control on the investment decisions of listed companies in the hope of 
providing more evidence regarding eﬃciency and government control.
Investment decisions are among the most important decisions of ﬁrms. Whether to 
GOVERNMENT CONTROL, UNCERTAINTY, AND 
INVESTMENT DECISIONS IN CHINA’S LISTED COMPANIES 133
invest, when to invest, and the choice of projects – all of these decisions aﬀect the return 
on investment, which has a direct effect on the firm’s future. Corporate investment 
behavior has long been of interest among academics and practitioners. Traditionally, 
the discounted cash ﬂow method, or net present value (NPV) method, has been used 
to make investment decisions. However, in a dynamic business environment, the NPV 
method fails to capture the value of project ﬂexibility. Therefore, real options theory 
has been applied to the investment decision-making process, in which the influence 
of uncertainty and the value of waiting on an irreversible investment are considered 
to incorporate more comprehensive information to modify and correct investment 
decisions. In the real options framework, an investment decision is the trade-oﬀ between 
investing immediately and waiting to obtain more valuable information. The greater is 
cash ﬂow uncertainty, the more value will be obtained by delaying investment. Therefore, 
investment and uncertainty are negatively related (eg, McDonald and Siegel, 1985; Dixit 
and Pindyck, 1994).
Government control affects the corporate governance of listed companies. 
Governments will also use the listed companies that they control to realize social and 
macroeconomic goals. Such inﬂuence is reﬂected in the investment decisions of listed 
companies. The investment decisions of government-controlled ﬁrms depend therefore 
on a set of factors: the risks and returns of projects; information and agency problems; 
the problem of poor governance among state-owned companies; and the inﬂuence of 
public policy. As a result, the extent to which investment depends on risks and returns 
is likely to be lower among firms controlled by government compared to privately 
owned ones. This paper aims to verify the foregoing argument by examining the relation 
between investment and uncertainty in China’s listed companies. Speciﬁcally, we expect 
the negative relation between investment and uncertainty to be weaker in government-
controlled listed companies than in privately controlled ones. This paper also examines 
whether the weak relation between investment and uncertainty arising from government 
control is eﬃcient or not.
The study ﬁnds that a negative relation exists between total ﬁrm uncertainty and 
investment among China’s listed companies. Therefore, the investment decision making 
of these companies is sensitive to uncertainty. However, this negative relation holds only 
for privately controlled ﬁrms. Fixed eﬀects regression analysis with an interaction term 
reveals that government control weakens the negative relation between investment and 
uncertainty. We then decompose total ﬁrm uncertainty into ﬁrm-speciﬁc, industry, and 
market uncertainty using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and regress investment 
on the three variables. Investment is found to be negatively related to firm-specific 
uncertainty in privately controlled listed companies and positively related to market 
uncertainty in state-controlled ones. That is, government control weakens the negative 
relation between investment and ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty and leads to a positive relation 
between investment and market uncertainty. The results demonstrate that government 
control increases the risk-taking preference of firms. The positive relation between 
investment and market uncertainty in government-controlled ﬁrms shows that, in the 
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case of greater macroeconomic risk, government will let state-owned companies increase 
the level of their investment to stimulate economic growth. We then divide the sample 
into two groups, ﬁrms with greater and those with fewer growth opportunities, and ﬁnd 
a lower level of investment-uncertainty sensitivity only in the latter group. This ﬁnding 
suggests that greater risk preference due to government control is not the result of 
rational decision making. Finally, we ﬁnd that among ﬁnancially distressed companies, 
because of risk shifting, or asset substitution, the negative relation between investment 
and uncertainty becomes nonsigniﬁcant, and that risk shifting is greater in government- 
than privately controlled companies. Hence, the inherent ﬂaw of state ownership, poor 
governance, remains diﬃcult to overcome.
The reforms of China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have included increasing 
decision-making rights, imposing taxes on profits, and establishing the contract and 
modern enterprise systems. The ultimate goal of SOE reform has been to eliminate 
government intervention. Undeniably, the reform has been successful overall. However, 
government intervention in SOEs still exists, and the corporate governance mechanisms 
of SOEs require improvement. 
This paper contributes to both the investment and the risk-taking literature. 
Regarding the former, most of the current literature on government control and 
investment behavior emphasizes the impact of ﬁnancing constraints caused by agency 
problems in state- and privately controlled enterprises. Many studies have found that 
state-controlled enterprises tend to over-invest, whereas privately controlled ones are apt 
to under-invest. Government control can lead listed companies to treat risk diﬀerently. 
In investigating the relation between uncertainty and investment, this paper reveals how 
the investment behavior of government- and privately controlled listed companies diﬀers 
because of their diﬀerent risk preferences.
In recent years, there has been increasing research interest in risk preference and 
its determinants. For example, Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005) and Cheng 
(2008) investigated the inﬂuence of CEO power and board size on ﬁrm performance. 
John, Litov, and Yeung (2008) and Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2008) examined 
the inﬂuence of investor protection and creditor protection on corporate risk taking. 
The current paper ﬁnds that government control has a positive eﬀect on corporate risk 
taking. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the 
investment-uncertainty relation; Section 3 analyzes how government control aﬀects the 
investment behavior of enterprises; Section 4 presents the results of the empirical tests; 
Section 5 investigates investment efficiency and agency problems under government 
control; and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Uncertainty and Investment
Research on corporate investment over the last twenty years has focused mainly on 
three areas: the relation between financial constraints and investment in incomplete 
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markets, namely, investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity (eg, Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 
1988; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Cleary, 1999) and investment-debt sensitivity; 
overinvestment and underinvestment caused by agency problems; and the relation 
between uncertainty and investment based on real options theory (eg, McDonald and 
Siegel, 1985; Leahy and Whited, 1996). Stein (2003) has conducted an excellent review 
of the ﬁrst two strands of the literature. Here, we mainly discuss the third.
Real options are nonfinancial options among which investors can choose in the 
process of investment decision making. The real options approach focuses on irreversible 
investment and how uncertainty and the value of waiting affect firm investment 
behavior. It adopts financial options theory to analyze investment behavior, treating 
investment opportunities as options owned by enterprises, and regarding investment 
behavior as the process of exercising those options. In addition to the project value based 
on cash ﬂows, the real options approach takes into account the values of time and of 
managerial ﬂexibility, and the value resulting from reducing uncertainty. Therefore, it 
can better predict ﬁrm investment behavior compared with other approaches.
The concept of real options was originally proposed by Myers (1977), who stated 
that the proﬁt created by cash ﬂows in an investment program is the sum of the values 
of the assets presently owned and future investment opportunities. That is, enterprises 
can obtain the right to buy or sell a real asset or an investment plan for some price in 
the future. We can use the way that ordinary options are assessed to evaluate real asset 
investment. McDonald and Siegel (1985) established a framework based on real options 
theory, which incorporates uncertainty, irreversibility, and corporate investment. They 
argued that the traditional neoclassical and Q theories fail to consider the speciﬁcity and 
irreversibility of capital investment and the resulting problem of sunk costs in the real 
world (McDonald and Siegel, 1985). The theory of irreversible investment holds that 
uncertainty exists in the capital asset investment decision-making process. That is, the 
future return on an investment is a random variable. In addition, traditional theories 
ignore the fact that investment opportunities do not disappear right away if money is 
not immediately invested. Therefore, the wait and see approach becomes valuable: as the 
economic environment changes over time, more information about the prospects of the 
investment project becomes available. A later decision may be the better one, especially 
when considering the irreversibility of investment. The ﬁrm may pay more if it decides 
to invest immediately and then tries to make changes to or retrieve its investment in 
the future. Combining uncertainty and irreversibility, investment theory oﬀers a useful 
approach for the assessment of real-world investment opportunities.
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) showed that when the return on an investment project 
exceeds an endogenous threshold generated by a model, the investment option will 
be exercised. This threshold not only is greater than the investment cost but also relies 
on the uncertainty of returns on investment assets. The greater is the uncertainty, 
the higher is the threshold; that is, a higher level of uncertainty will result in a lower 
level of investment. Caballero and Pindyck (1996) studied the eﬀects of industry and 
idiosyncratic uncertainty on irreversible investment, and tested the proposition that 
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an increase in uncertainty would increase the investment trigger point, and found a 
positive relation between uncertainty and the trigger point. Using data from a panel 
of US manufacturing ﬁrms, Leahy and Whited (1996) found that uncertainty had a 
negative eﬀect on investment, consistent with irreversible investment theory. Minton 
and Schrand (1999) used cash flow volatility as a proxy for uncertainty, and found 
that a higher level of cash ﬂow was associated with greater ﬁnancing costs and lower 
investment levels. Extending the concept of investment to include human resource 
investment, Rosenberg (2004) grouped ﬁrms into labor-intensive and capital-intensive 
groups and found a negative relation between uncertainty and both types of irreversible 
investment. Bulan (2005) decomposed total ﬁrm uncertainty into market, industry, and 
ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty according to the CAPM and veriﬁed not only that investment 
and uncertainty are negatively related but also that increased industry uncertainty has 
a pronounced negative eﬀect on ﬁrm investment. Eisdorfer (2008) provided empirical 
evidence that financially distressed firms engage in risk shifting by testing a positive 
relation between uncertainty and investment; and that the investments of such ﬁrms 
generate less value during times of greater uncertainty.
To summarize, according to financial options theory, the greater is the price of 
underlying ﬂuctuations, the greater is the value of delaying investment and the weaker 
is the motivation to exercise the option to invest right now. According to real options 
theory, given greater expected cash flow volatility, deferring investment is more 
valuable; that is, ﬁrms will wait rather than invest now. Therefore, uncertainty and ﬁrm 
investment are negatively related. Generally speaking, uncertainty can influence firm 
investment in two ways. On the one hand, the value of waiting motivates ﬁrms to defer 
their investment to obtain more information or wait until conditions become certain. 
On the other hand, uncertainty can reduce the investment level by influencing the 
optimal scale of the risky project. Based on the foregoing discussion, we propose the ﬁrst 
hypothesis:
H1: A signiﬁcantly negative relation exists between uncertainty and investment.
3. Government Control and Firm Investment Behavior
The reform of the investment system has been an integral part of China’s economic 
reform over the past three decades. In the transition from a centrally planned to a 
market economy, three main changes have been made to the investment system (Xin, 
2007). First, investment entities have greatly diversiﬁed, changing from various levels 
of government to state- and privately owned entities. Second, funding channels have 
multiplied, changing from solely treasury budgets to a variety of sources, including 
internal funds, bank loans, treasury allocations, and foreign capital. Finally, the manner 
of government involvement in corporate investment and ﬁnancing has changed, from 
direct (administrative management) to indirect (market regulation).
However, great diﬀerences still exist between SOEs and privately owned enterprises. 
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First, although a series of reforms have been implemented over the transition period, 
including imposing taxes on profits and implementing contract and shareholding 
schemes, the government still intervenes in the operation of SOEs, requiring them to 
perform macroeconomic control and social welfare functions. For example, the ﬁnancial 
turmoil caused by the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States swept across the 
globe, triggering a worldwide economic recession. To prevent economic recession, 
the Chinese government launched a four trillion yuan investment plan in November 
2008 to stimulate social capital investment, strengthen the agricultural sector, modify 
the pattern of economic growth and development, and promote major infrastructure 
construction. The plan was, to a large extent, realized through investment by SOEs.
Second, government control cannot prevent the inherent disadvantage of state 
ownership, that is, the agency problems caused by the absence of the real owners (Alchain, 
1965). Managers of SOEs have centralized control rights but no cash ﬂow rights. Hence, 
they have an incentive to maximize their own interests at the expense of those of the 
ﬁrm. For example, SOE managers tend to pursue political goals (political performance 
and promotion) rather than state ones (Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1996; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1994). Among the most important indicators in assessing the performance 
of officials in China are output and fiscal revenue. To maximize output and revenue 
growth, government oﬃcials will expand business. Such expansion is inevitable when 
government and managers have the same target. For SOE managers, the larger is the 
SOE, the greater are the resources that they control, the higher is their personal income 
level, and the higher is the administrative level that they can achieve.2 
Finally, SOEs lack eﬀective monitoring and incentive mechanisms. Two or more of 
the positions of chair, general manager, Party secretary, or other key posts may be held 
by the same person in the SOE or positions may overlap to a high degree. Therefore, 
the systems of checks and balances regulating the general meeting of stockholders, the 
board, and the board of supervisors may be compromised. In addition, China’s market 
mechanisms are immature. The product, capital, and managers’ markets fail to eﬀectively 
monitor managers. Compared to their counterparts in private firms, SOE managers 
have more opportunities to transfer the risk of failure to the government and banks. 
Also, although the link between the assessment and bonuses of SOE managers with ﬁrm 
performance has been established in recent years, the assessment indicators have yet to 
be improved and the compensation system has little eﬀect on long-term performance.3 
In short, government control inﬂuences corporate investment decisions both because 
listed SOEs have to fulﬁll certain public policy goals and because investment decision 
2 For example, Wei and Liu (2007) found that SOE managers are obsessed with expanding the scale of business 
and adopt aggressive investment strategies; however, they are more concerned about private benefits than 
returns or economies of scale.
3 For example, Xin, Lin, and Wang (2007) found a tendency toward overinvestment among low income 
managers in firms controlled by the state assets management bureaus and the SOEs affiliated with local 
governments.
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4 Some scholars claim that state-owned banks are also compelled to fulﬁll government objectives, and to provide 
support to SOEs. If SOEs have ﬁnancial problems, then the banks can oﬀset such problems by asking for 
government subsidies. However, they will be blamed for their failure to collect on loans to non-SOEs. This 
leads banks to reduce the loan qualiﬁcation requirements for state-owned enterprises (Cull and Xu, 2003; 
Brandt and Li, 2003; Allen, Qian, and Qian, 2005; Ge and Qiu, 2007). As government-controlled listed 
companies can obtain loans more easily than can their privately controlled counterparts, the former can take 
greater risks. However, Firth, Malatesta, Xin, and Xu (2010) found no evidence of bank credit discrimination 
among listed companies, so we do not make the assumption of credit discrimination here.
5 We delete small and medium board-listed companies because their ﬁrm size is usually too small, and their risk 
level and investment mode diﬀer greatly from those of main board companies. We use only manufacturing 
ﬁrms for two reasons: ﬁrst, the level of capital assets varies greatly between ﬁrms in manufacturing and those 
in other industries; second, the investment of ﬁrms in other industries may not be in the form of capital assets. 
Finally, we drop B-share, H-share, and other foreign share ﬁrms. Because each market has its own evaluation 
level, it is diﬃcult to calculate precisely and consistently the Tobin’s Q of those ﬁrms.
6 According to the Guidelines for Articles of Association of Listed Companies (CSRC, 1997), the controlling 
shareholder refers to the shareholder who meets one of the following conditions: (1) this person alone or acting 
with others can select more than half of the directors; (2) this person alone or acting with others can exercise 
more than 30% of the voting rights of the company or can control the exercise of more than 30% of the voting 
rights; (3) this person alone or acting with others can hold 30% of the company shares; (4) this person alone or 
acting with others can in fact control the company in other ways.
7 In rare cases (1.5% of the sample), the listed companies have no controlling shareholders. We then determine 
whether the listed companies are government controlled in accordance with the nature of the ultimate 
controller of the largest shareholders.
making is inﬂuenced by the agency problems inherent in state ownership.4 In particular, 
such control makes listed SOEs less sensitive to uncertainty. Therefore, we propose the 
second hypothesis:
 H2: Government control weakens the negative relation between uncertainty and 
investment.
4. Empirical Tests
4.1. Sample and Descriptive Statistics
Our sample includes all main board pure A-share manufacturing ﬁrms listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 1999 to 2008.5 For each ﬁrm year, we 
identify the controlling shareholders of the listed companies using the Guidelines for 
Articles of Association of Listed Companies of the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) (1997).6 Then, we divide listed companies into government- and privately 
controlled based on the type (state or private) of ultimate owner among the controlling 
shareholders.7 Investment (I) is deﬁned as changes in capital assets plus amortization in 
the current year. Following Leahy and Whited (1996), we measure uncertainty using 
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8 Some studies use proﬁt volatility, cash ﬂow volatility, or sales revenue volatility as a proxy for uncertainty (eg, 
Minton and Schrand, 1999). Compared with those proxies, stock price can reﬂect more comprehensively the 
macro and micro factors faced by companies, and is forward looking. Hence, stock price can substitute for 
expected uncertainty. Also, some studies adopt the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
(GARCH) model, which requires time series data, to estimate expected uncertainty (eg, Eisdorfer, 2008). 
However, the history of China’s stock market is relatively short; thus, that method is not suitable, either.
9 The annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns is calculated as the standard deviation of daily stock 
returns in the year multiplied by the square root of 250, which is the number of trading days in a year.
the variance of stock returns.8 Speciﬁcally, total ﬁrm uncertainty (UC) is measured as 
the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns.9 The advantage of using the 
variance of stock returns is that the returns contain the various kinds of uncertainty 
faced by ﬁrms including input and output and macro and micro factors. Many studies 
demonstrate that investment is related to investment opportunities, the level of internal 
funds, and the debt level, so we control for these factors in our regression equations. 
We use the beginning Tobin’s Q as the proxy for investment opportunity, calculated 
as the market value of tradable shares plus the book value of non-tradable shares and 
total liabilities, divided by the book value of total assets. The level of internal funds is 
substituted by the operating cash ﬂow (CF). To eliminate the inﬂuence of scale, I and 
CF are both divided by beginning-of-period capital assets (K) and denoted as I/K and 
CF/K, respectively. The debt level is measured by the beginning debt-to-asset ratio 
(LEV), namely, the proportion of total liabilities to total assets. Two variables are used 
to measure government control, Gov and State. Gov is a dummy variable that is coded 
as one if the ultimate controller of a listed company is the government, a stated-owned 
assets management bureau, or a state-owned enterprise, and zero otherwise. State is 
the sum of the proportion of shares owned by the government, the stated-owned assets 
management bureau, or the state-controlled enterprises in a listed company. We drop 
ﬁrms with missing ﬁnancial data and those with fewer than 60 trading days in a year to 
calculate reliable UCs. All continuous variables are winsorized at the ﬁrst and ninety-
ninth percentiles. The ﬁnal sample has 5,406 ﬁrm years, of which 3,909 (72.31%) are 
government controlled and 1,497 (27.69%) are privately controlled. The ownership data 
are hand collected from annual reports, and the ﬁnancial and trading data are retrieved 
from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database.
Total ﬁrm uncertainty represents the uncertainties due to market, industry, and ﬁrm-
specific factors. The traditional view asserts that systematic risk, market uncertainty 
under the CAPM, influences firm investment by affecting the firm’s cost of capital. 
In contrast, real options theory holds that total firm uncertainty matters for firm 
investment. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) claimed that capital irreversibility is more 
pronounced at the industry level. Bulan (2005) decomposed total ﬁrm uncertainty into 
market, industry, and ﬁrm-speciﬁc components, and found that both industry and ﬁrm-
speciﬁc uncertainty had a negative eﬀect on ﬁrm investment. 
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Following Bulan (2005), to decompose total ﬁrm uncertainty into market, industry, 
and ﬁrm-speciﬁc components, we ﬁrst estimate the following two-index model for each 
ﬁrm year:
       (1)
where τ = 1, 2, ... ti; ti is the trading days in year t; riτ is the daily returns of ﬁrm i’s 
equity; rMτ is the daily market returns (total market capitalization weighted index of all 
of the A-shares traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges); and rIτ is the 
daily industry returns (total market capitalization weighted index of all of the A-share 
companies of the corresponding industry). We use the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) manufacturing sub-categories (C0-C9) to classify industries and 
construct the industry index. βit and γit are the market and industry betas, respectively. 
The annualized standard deviation of residuals from the regression of equation (1) is the 
estimated ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty. Market uncertainty is calculated as βit multiplied 
by the annualized standard deviation of daily returns on the market index. Similarly, 
industry uncertainty is measured as the product of γit and the annualized standard 
deviation of daily returns on the industry index. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the whole sample and sub-samples based 
on type of controlling shareholder. The mean and median of total uncertainty (annualized 
standard deviation of daily stock returns) are 46.11% and 42.60%, respectively. The 
level of uncertainty is a little lower among government-controlled listed companies (mean 
and median of 45.33% and 41.92%, respectively), compared with that among privately 
controlled listed companies (mean and median of 48.15% and 45.37%, respectively). 
After decomposing total firm uncertainty, firm-specific uncertainty has a mean and 
median of 34.18% and 32.62%, respectively, and again, the mean and median for 
government-controlled listed companies are lower. Industry uncertainty, with a mean and 
median of 29.25% and 26.45%, respectively, is not as great as ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty, 
but is similar in government- and privately controlled companies. There is little market 
uncertainty (mean and median of only -0.91% and -0.76%, respectively) after taking 
industry and ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty out of total ﬁrm uncertainty. It is amazing that in 
most ﬁrm years, market uncertainty has a negative value. This is because the estimates 
of βit in equation (1) are usually negative. One possible reason is that the market index 
reﬂects the stock performance of all listed companies and is greatly inﬂuenced by those 
large cap stocks.10 However, such stocks are almost always monopolized by the ﬁnancial 
and energy industries, so the market fundamentals reﬂected in the market index may 
deviate from those for our sample manufacturing ﬁrms.
10 For example, at the end of 2009, the top ten stocks (ranked by market capitalization) on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange were all ﬁnancial and energy companies, such as China Petroleum and the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China. Our sample excludes all of those companies, which account for as much as 30% 
to 40% of the total market capitalization of the Shanghai Stock Exchange.
riτ = αiτ + βitrMτ + γitrIτ + εiτ
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The mean and median investment ratios are 23.95% and 14.69%, respectively, and 
those for government-controlled companies are slightly higher. Tobin’s Q has a mean 
of 1.5702 and a median of 1.3622, and is larger in privately controlled companies. 
The operating cash ﬂow (CF/K), which has a mean of 16.44% and median of 14.23%, 
diﬀers little between government- and privately controlled ﬁrms. The mean and median 
of debt level (LEV) are 47.76% and 46.54%, respectively, and are much lower in 
government-controlled listed companies. Finally, the mean and median of state-owned 
shares (State) are 38.42% and 42.59%, respectively. Naturally, state-owned shares are at 
a very low level in privately controlled listed companies, with a median of 0. However, 
in government-controlled listed companies, the mean and median of State are 51.22% 
and 52.89%, respectively.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Whole Sample
(N = 5,406)
Government Controlled 
(n = 3,909)
Privately Controlled 
(n = 1,497)
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
UC 0.4611 0.4260 0.4533 0.4192 0.4815*** 0.4537***
UCF 0.3418 0.3262 0.3334 0.3171 0.3639 0.3544***
UCI 0.2935 0.2645 0.2926 0.2646 0.2957 0.2641*
UCM -0.0091 -0.0076 -0.0090 -0.0075 -0.0094 -0.0077
I/K 0.2395 0.1469 0.2432 0.1515 0.2298 0.1330***
Q 1.5702 1.3622 1.5233 1.3528 1.6926*** 1.4038***
CF/K 0.1644 0.1423 0.1663 0.1406 0.1593 0.1464
LEV 0.4776 0.4654 0.4686 0.4597 0.5010*** 0.4792**
State 0.3842 0.4259 0.5122 0.5289 0.0502*** 0.0000***
Note: UC is total ﬁrm uncertainty, measured as the current year annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns. UCF is 
ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty, UCI is industry uncertainty, and UCM is market uncertainty. To calculate UCF, UCI, and UCM, 
we ﬁrst regress the following two-index equation for each ﬁrm year: riτ = αiτ + βitrMτ + γitrIτ + εiτ, where τ = 1, 2, ... 
ti; ti is the trading days in year t; riτ is the daily returns of ﬁrm i’s equity; rMτ is the daily market returns (total market 
capitalization weighted index of all of the A-shares traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges); and rIτ is the 
daily industry returns (total market capitalization weighted index of all of the A-share companies of the corresponding 
industry). βit and γit are the market and industry betas, respectively. The annualized standard deviation of residuals from 
the regression of the equation is the estimated ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty. Market uncertainty is calculated as βit multiplied 
by the annualized standard deviation of daily returns on the market index. Similarly, industry uncertainty is measured 
as the product of γit and the annualized standard deviation of daily returns on the industry index. I/K is the investment 
level, which is measured as the current year changes in capital assets plus amortization, divided by the beginning-of-
period capital assets. Q is the beginning Tobin’s Q, calculated as the market value of tradable shares plus the book value 
of non-tradable shares and total liabilities, divided by the book value of total assets. CF/K is the ratio of the current 
year operating cash ﬂow to beginning capital assets, and LEV is the beginning debt-to-asset ratio. State is the proportion 
of state-owned shares. ***, **, and * represent statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between government- and privately 
controlled ﬁrms at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Next, we test the correlations among the main variables, and the results are 
reported in Table 2. The upper right triangle shows the Spearman’s rho correlation 
coefficients, and the lower left triangle shows the Pearson correlation coefficients. 
We can see that total ﬁrm uncertainty is highly positively related to ﬁrm-speciﬁc and 
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industry uncertainty, but negatively related to market uncertainty. Consistent with our 
predictions, investment (I/K) is negatively related to total ﬁrm uncertainty (UC), ﬁrm-
specific uncertainty, and industry uncertainty. However, a positive relation is found 
between investment and market uncertainty, as in Bulan (2005). Bulan (2005) asserted 
that market uncertainty represents investment opportunities and therefore is positively 
related to investment. We believe that in China’s case, there are two other possible 
reasons for the positive investment-market uncertainty relation. First, the market 
index reveals risks in the whole market, which are not necessarily the same across the 
manufacturing sector as the index is heavily influenced by the performance of giant 
ﬁnancial and energy companies. Second, if the market index represents the weathercock 
of the macro economy, then the positive relation may be the result of government 
behavior. When the government expects economic risk to increase, it will push state-
controlled listed companies to invest more to stimulate economic growth. Finally, the 
relations between investment and the control variables Q, CF/K, and LEV are positive, 
positive, and negative, respectively, consistent with the theory and literature.
Table 2. Correlation Results
Spearman
Pearson UC UCF UCI UCM I/K Q CF/K LEV
UC 1.000 0.890*** 0.727*** -0.279*** -0.209*** -0.005 -0.076*** 0.245*** 
UCF 0.862*** 1.000 0.389*** -0.194*** -0.231*** -0.045*** -0.084*** 0.285*** 
UCI 0.800*** 0.404*** 1.000 -0.320*** -0.079*** -0.008 -0.042*** 0.065*** 
UCM -0.258*** -0.188*** -0.262*** 1.000 0.181*** 0.136*** 0.105*** -0.134*** 
I/K -0.115*** -0.138*** -0.048*** 0.129*** 1.000 0.089*** 0.232*** -0.176*** 
Q 0.141*** 0.076*** 0.132*** 0.082*** 0.058*** 1.000 0.058*** -0.200*** 
CF/K -0.041*** -0.045*** -0.027** 0.082*** 0.181*** 0.061*** 1.000 -0.096*** 
LEV 0.199*** 0.278*** 0.017 -0.114*** -0.167*** 0.081*** -0.049*** 1.000 
Note: See the deﬁnitions of the variables in the note beneath Table 1. ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
To directly observe the relation between investment and uncertainty, we ﬁrst group 
total ﬁrm uncertainty (UC) into 20 quantiles (ventiles), and plot the mean and median 
values of I/K according to each ventile of CF/K. The results are shown in Figure 1a, 
where the abscissa represents the medians of each ventile of UC. We can see that as total 
firm uncertainty increases, investment declines correspondingly. The figure therefore 
shows a negative relation between uncertainty and investment.
To intuitively observe the different investment-uncertainty sensitivities of 
government- and privately controlled companies, we then separately plot the median 
values of I/K for the two types of ﬁrms according to each ventile of CF/K.11 The results 
11 Plotting the chart using the means yields similar results.
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are shown in Figure 1b, where the abscissa represents the order of ventiles of UC from 
low to high. GOV represents the government-controlled sample, and PRI represents the 
privately controlled sample. Figure 1b shows that the magnitude of the decrease in the 
level of investment as uncertainty increases is smaller in government-controlled listed 
companies than in privately controlled ones. That is, the investment decisions made by 
the former companies are less sensitive to uncertainty than are those made by the latter 
ﬁrms.
Figure 1a. Uncertainty and Investment
Figure 1b. Government Control, Uncertainty, and Investment
Our sample covers a relatively long period, namely, ten years. Therefore, it is possible 
to check the time-series patterns of the main variables. We report and plot the means 
and medians of uncertainty and the investment variables for each year in Table 3, Figure 
2a, and Figure 2b. We ﬁnd that uncertainty and investment levels are relatively stable 
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before 2004. However, from 2005, the level of uncertainty increases whereas that of 
investment decreases yearly. This general trend of changing uncertainty and investment 
levels reveals the increase in the level of economic uncertainty since 2005 due to share-
split reform and the worldwide ﬁnancial crisis caused by the subprime mortgage crisis 
in the United States. Figures 2a and 2b clearly show that the levels of firm-specific 
uncertainty and investment always change in opposite directions; therefore, we speculate 
that the two have a strictly negative relation. Overall, total ﬁrm uncertainty, ﬁrm-speciﬁc 
uncertainty, and industry uncertainty move in opposite directions from investment, 
whereas market uncertainty and investment always move in the same direction. The 
findings are consistent with the results of the correlation coefficient analysis. These 
trends also indicate the existence of ﬁxed annual eﬀects in the main variables; that is, the 
observations in the same year may be correlated with each other. Hence, we control for 
year and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects in all of the regression analyses, and use the robust standard 
errors to calculate the T-values.
Table 3. Time-Series Statistics of Uncertainty and Investment
Year UC UCF UCI UCM I/K
1999 Mean 0.4457 0.3379 0.2822 -0.0067 0.2834
(n = 341) Median 0.4400 0.3294 0.2893 -0.0088 0.1795
2000 Mean 0.4150 0.3552 0.2047 0.0077 0.2922
(n = 400) Median 0.4122 0.3496 0.2081 0.0054 0.1789
2001 Mean 0.3268 0.2285 0.2250 -0.0029 0.2956
(n = 472) Median 0.3222 0.2176 0.2356 -0.0019 0.1846
2002 Mean 0.3641 0.2186 0.2837 -0.0047 0.2708
(n = 522) Median 0.3585 0.2069 0.2889 -0.0034 0.1853
2003 Mean 0.3057 0.2401 0.1785 -0.0019 0.2834
(n = 564) Median 0.3006 0.2291 0.1812 -0.0028 0.1897
2004 Mean 0.3781 0.2947 0.2295 -0.0038 0.2596
(n = 601) Median 0.3714 0.2829 0.2290 -0.0044 0.1804
2005 Mean 0.4278 0.3280 0.2693 -0.0196 0.2164
(n = 630) Median 0.4297 0.3231 0.2738 -0.0219 0.1336
2006 Mean 0.4980 0.4149 0.2613 -0.0129 0.1824
(n = 631) Median 0.4838 0.4038 0.2665 -0.0152 0.1128
2007 Mean 0.6546 0.5075 0.3920 -0.0149 0.1478
(n = 621) Median 0.6506 0.4980 0.4053 -0.0156 0.0846
2008 Mean 0.7061 0.4368 0.5407 -0.0210 0.2263
(n = 624) Median 0.7104 0.4292 0.5648 -0.0216 0.1320
Note: See the deﬁnitions of the variables in the note beneath Table 1.
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Figure 2a. Time Series Distributions of Uncertainty and Investment (Mean)
Figure 2b. Time Series Distributions of Uncertainty and Investment (Median)
4.2. Regression Analysis
The abovementioned descriptive statistics, univariate variable analysis, and intuitive 
graphical analysis do not control for other factors that may affect firm investment 
decisions. To control for other factors, including investment opportunities, level of 
internal funds, and debt ratio, and to examine the negative relation between investment 
and uncertainty (ie, Hypothesis 1), we set investment (I/K) as the dependent variable 
and total ﬁrm uncertainty (UC) as the independent variable and incorporate the control 
variables Q, CF/K, and LEV into the investment equations, to construct the following 
ﬁxed eﬀects model:
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We expect β1 to be significantly negative. In the Q theory of investment, Q 
represents investment opportunities. The greater are future investment opportunities, the 
more ﬁrms will invest. Hence, we expect β2 to be positive. Additionally, the literature 
shows that, because of ﬁnancial constraints, ﬁrm investment is associated with internal 
funds. Cleary, Povel, and Raith (2007) and Firth, Malatesta, Xin, and Xu (2010) found 
that the trade-oﬀ between liquidation risk and revenue generation leads to a signiﬁcant 
positive relation between investment level and the quadratic term of cash ﬂow, that is, a 
U-shaped investment-cash ﬂow relation. Hence, we include CF and the quadratic term 
of CF in our model and predict that both β3 and β4 will be positive. Finally, because of 
debt overhang and the agency problem of free cash ﬂow, debt is expected to be negatively 
related to investment, and β5 to be negative. Finally, we incorporate ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects 
(νi) into the regression equation to control for the eﬀects of other unknown factors that 
cause the investment level to vary across ﬁrms, and time ﬁxed eﬀects (ηj) to control for 
investment changes caused by time factors.
Table 4 reports the regression results. We find that investment and total firm 
uncertainty are signiﬁcantly negatively related. Investment level decreases 0.155% with 
a 1% increase in total ﬁrm uncertainty, which supports Hypothesis 1. The regression 
results of the control variables are highly consistent with our predictions. To examine 
the influence of government control on the investment-uncertainty relation and test 
Hypothesis 2, we regress equation (2) for government- and privately controlled listed 
companies, respectively. The results are also shown in Table 4. We ﬁnd that government- 
and privately controlled companies react differently to total firm uncertainty. The 
negative relation between investment and total firm uncertainty in government-
controlled listed companies becomes nonsignificant, whereas in privately controlled 
listed companies it remains signiﬁcant. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is supported.
Table 4. Regression Results for Uncertainty and Investment
Dependent 
variable: I/K Whole Sample Government Controlled Privately Controlled
UC -0.155 -0.101 -0.297
(-1.86*) (-1.06) (-1.88*)
Q 0.091 0.074 0.121
(5.86***) (3.62***) (4.36***)
CF/K 0.038 -0.013 0.107
(1.18) (-0.30) (2.25**)
(CF/K)2 0.342 0.389 0.312
(8.67***) (7.31***) (5.07***)
LEV -0.393 -0.456 -0.326
(-7.87***) (-6.22***) (-4.40***)
Cons 0.356 0.373 0.431
(7.19***) (6.23***) (3.85***)
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Year Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.1453 0.1453 0.1832
No. of Obs. 5,406 3,909 1,497
No. of Firms 663 529 259
F-Statistics 23.50 13.78 12.24
Note: The dependent variable is the investment level (I/K). The independent variables are UC, Q, CF/K, (CF/K)2, and LEV. 
UC is total ﬁrm uncertainty, measured as the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns; Q is the beginning 
Tobin’s Q, which is the market value of tradable shares plus the book value of non-tradable shares and total liabilities, 
divided by the book value of total assets; CF/K is the ratio of the current year operating cash ﬂow to beginning capital 
assets; and LEV is the beginning debt-to-asset ratio. The regression equation contains ﬁrm and year ﬁxed eﬀects, and Cons 
is the mean of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. R2 is R2-within from the ﬁxed eﬀects panel data regression. The T-values calculated using 
the robust standard errors adjusted for the cluster of ﬁrms are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
To test whether the negative relation between investment and total ﬁrm uncertainty 
diﬀers signiﬁcantly between government- and privately controlled listed companies, we 
introduce government control and the interaction term of government control and total 
ﬁrm uncertainty into equation (2). We use two proxies for government control, Gov and 
State. Table 5 displays the regression results. We can see that the coeﬃcients of UC are 
negative and signiﬁcant, indicating a negative relation between total ﬁrm uncertainty 
and investment. The coeﬃcients of both Gov and State are negative, which indicates 
that, controlling for other factors, the investment level of government-controlled 
companies is somewhat lower than that of privately owned ones. The coeﬃcients of the 
interaction term of government control and UC are both signiﬁcantly positive. These 
results again demonstrate that government control reduces the sensitivity of investment 
to total ﬁrm uncertainty, supporting Hypothesis 2. In sum, government- and privately 
controlled listed companies treat uncertainty diﬀerently, with the former tending to have 
a greater appetite for risk.
Table 5. Regression Results for Government Control, Uncertainty, and Investment
Dependent variable: I/K Whole Sample Dependent variable: I/K Whole Sample
UC -0.339 UC -0.354
(-3.29***) (-3.47***)
Gov -0.124 State -0.212
(-2.62***) (-2.50**)
Gov*UC 0.270 State*UC 0.558
(3.35***) (3.46***)
Q 0.092 Q 0.092
(5.92***) (5.91***)
CF/K 0.036 CF/K 0.037
(1.12) (1.15)
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(CF/K)2 0.345 (CF/K)
2
0.344
(8.71***) (8.74***)
LEV -0.391 LEV -0.392
(-7.84***) (-7.85***)
Cons 0.439 Cons 0.425
(6.92***) (6.75***)
Year Eﬀects Yes Year Eﬀects Yes
R2 0.1475 R2 0.1480
No. of Obs. 5,406 No. of Obs. 5,406
No. of Firms 663 No. of Firms 663
F-Statistics 21.38 F-Statistics 21.30
Note: The dependent variable is the investment level (I/K). The independent variables are UC, Gov (State), Gov*UC (State*UC), 
Q, CF/K, (CF/K)2, and LEV. UC is total ﬁrm uncertainty, measured as the annualized standard deviation of daily 
stock returns. Gov is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the listed company is controlled by the government, and 
zero otherwise. State is the proportion of state-owned shares. Q is the beginning Tobin’s Q, which is the market value of 
tradable shares plus the book value of non-tradable shares and total liabilities, divided by the book value of total assets. 
CF/K is the ratio of the current year operating cash ﬂow to beginning capital assets. LEV is the beginning debt-to-asset 
ratio. The regression equation contains ﬁrm and year ﬁxed eﬀects, and Cons is the mean of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. R2 is R2-
within from the ﬁxed eﬀects panel data regression. The T-values calculated using the robust standard errors adjusted for 
the cluster of ﬁrms are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.
We then investigate the relation between investment and decomposed components 
of total ﬁrm uncertainty. We substitute total ﬁrm uncertainty (UC) in equation (2) with 
firm-specific uncertainty (UCF), industry uncertainty (UCI), and market uncertainty 
(UCM). The regression results are reported in Table 6. When regressed on the whole 
sample, investment and ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty are negatively related, supporting the real 
options theory. Consistent with the ﬁndings of Bulan (2005), investment is positively 
related to market uncertainty. We again perform separate regressions for government- 
and privately controlled listed companies. We ﬁnd that the negative relation between 
investment and firm-specific uncertainty is mainly driven by the privately controlled 
listed companies, conﬁrming the second hypothesis. In contrast, the positive relation 
between investment and market uncertainty is primarily driven by the government-
controlled listed companies. This indicates that with increasing market (or macro 
economy) uncertainty, government-controlled listed companies will increase their level 
of investment. The results verify that the investment decisions of government-controlled 
listed companies are to some extent politically oriented. It is well known that the growth 
of China’s economy is investment driven. Whenever the economic environment is 
volatile or the level of market risk increases, the government oﬀers a stimulus package, 
such as the aforementioned four trillion yuan investment plan. In addition, SOEs are 
always the ﬁrst to carry out the government’s plans.
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Table 6. Regression Results for Investment and Decomposed Uncertainty 
Dependent variable: I/K Whole Sample Government Controlled Privately Controlled
UCF -0.142 -0.065 -0.316
(-1.87*) (-0.71) (-2.31**)
UCI -0.046 0.037 -0.143
(-0.46) (0.32) (-0.81)
UCM 0.423 0.886 -0.388
(2.00**) (3.56***) (-1.05)
Q 0.088 0.069 0.125
(5.67***) (3.39***) (4.48***)
CF/K 0.038 -0.011 0.107
(1.18) (-0.26) (2.26**)
(CF/K)2 0.342 0.386 0.314
(8.67***) (7.29***) (5.10***)
LEV -0.387 -0.445 -0.322
(-7.69***) (-6.04***) (-4.31***)
Cons 0.351 0.349 0.436
(6.91***) (5.76***) (3.90***)
Year Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.1462 0.1488 0.1846
No. of Obs. 5,406 3,909 1,497
No. of Firms 663 529 259
F-Statistics 20.80 12.93 10.83
Note: The dependent variable is the investment level (I/K). The independent variables are UCF, UCI, UCM, Q, CF/K, (CF/
K)2, and LEV. UCF is ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty, UCI is industry uncertainty, and UCM is market uncertainty. Q is the 
beginning Tobin’s Q, which is the market value of tradable shares plus the book value of non-tradable shares and total 
liabilities, divided by the book value of total assets. CF/K is the ratio of the current operating cash ﬂow to beginning 
capital assets. LEV is the beginning debt-to-asset ratio. The regression equation contains ﬁrm and year ﬁxed eﬀects, and 
Cons is the mean of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. R2 is R2-within from the ﬁxed eﬀects panel data regression. The T-values calculated 
using the robust standard errors adjusted for the cluster of ﬁrms are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
To examine whether the inﬂuence of government control on the relation between 
investment and each component of uncertainty is statistically signiﬁcant, we introduce 
government control and the interaction terms of government control and the diﬀerent 
componentss of uncertainty into our regression equation. The regression results are 
reported in Table 7. The results, which are consistent with those presented in Table 6, 
show that after controlling for industry and market uncertainty, investment and ﬁrm-
specific uncertainty are significantly negatively related. Meanwhile, the interaction 
terms of government control and ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty and market uncertainty are 
both positive, indicating that government control greatly weakens the negative relation 
between investment and firm-specific uncertainty, and makes the relation between 
investment and market uncertainty positive.
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Table 7. Regression Results for Government Control, Decomposed Uncertainty, and Investment
Dependent variable: I/K Whole Sample Dependent variable: I/K Whole Sample
UCF -0.359 UCF -0.341
(-3.30***) (-3.20***)
UCI -0.156 UCI -0.172
(-1.15) (-1.27)
UCM -0.476 UCM -0.203
(-1.23) (-0.54)
Gov -0.153 State -0.244
(-3.13***) (-2.83***)
Gov*UCF 0.325 State*UCF 0.579
(2.72***) (2.46**)
Gov*UCI 0.178 State*UCI 0.371
(1.51) (1.58)
Gov*UCM 1.298 State*UCM 1.764
(2.91***) (2.02**)
Q 0.091 Q 0.090
(5.86***) (5.77***)
CF/K 0.037 CF/K 0.038
(1.14) (1.17)
(CF/K)2 0.344 (CF/K)
2
0.343
(8.74***) (8.73***)
LEV -0.384 LEV -0.385
(-7.64***) (-7.64***)
Cons 0.448 Cons 0.426
(6.92***) (6.64***)
Year Eﬀects Yes Year Eﬀects Yes
R2 0.1506 R
2
0.1501
No. of Obs. 5,406 No. of Obs. 5,406
No. of Firms 663 No. of Firms 663
F-Statistics 18.02 F-Statistics 17.70
Note: The dependent variable is the investment level (I/K). The independent variables are UCF, UCI, UCM, Gov (State), Gov* 
UCF (State* UCF), Gov* UCI (State* UCI), Gov* UCM (State* UCM), Q, CF/K, (CF/K)
2, and LEV. UCF is ﬁrm-speciﬁc 
uncertainty, UCI is industry uncertainty, and UCM is market uncertainty. Gov is a dummy variable that is equal to one 
if the listed company is controlled by the government, and zero otherwise. State is the proportion of state-owned shares. Q 
is the beginning Tobin’s Q, which is the market value of tradable shares plus the book value of non-tradable shares and 
total liabilities, divided by the book value of total assets. CF/K is the ratio of the current operating cash ﬂow to beginning 
capital assets. LEV is the beginning debt-to-asset ratio. The regression equation contains ﬁrm and year ﬁxed eﬀects, and 
Cons is the mean of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. R2 is R2-within from the ﬁxed eﬀects panel data regression. The T-values calculated 
using the robust standard errors adjusted for the cluster of ﬁrms are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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To summarize, we discover that among China’s listed companies, investment is 
negatively related to both total ﬁrm uncertainty and ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty. However, 
this negative relation holds only for privately controlled listed companies. Among 
government-controlled listed companies, the negative relation between investment and 
total firm uncertainty or firm-specific uncertainty is nonsignificant, whereas market 
uncertainty has a positive eﬀect on investment. Therefore, the empirical results support 
our hypotheses.
4.3. Robustness Checks
We conduct a series of robustness tests to check the reliability of our empirical 
results. First, because of diﬀerences in investment across industries, our sample includes 
only manufacturing ﬁrms. However, when we include all non-ﬁnancial companies in 
the sample, the same conclusions are obtained. Second, we use the variability of the 
weekly returns of stock returns to measure uncertainty, and the results are basically the 
same. Third, using the variability of the diﬀerence between ﬁrm and market returns as 
a proxy for firm-specific uncertainty, we obtain the same conclusions. Fourth, using 
the equal weight average or tradable market value weighted average returns to calculate 
industry uncertainty and market uncertainty, we get similar results. Finally, because of 
the diﬀerences in valuation between tradable and non-tradable shares in China’s A-share 
listed companies, we treat the market value of tradable shares as their market price and 
calculate the market value of non-tradable shares according to the book value of the 
net assets when we calculate Q. We also use the total market capitalization and 70% of 
the stock price to calculate the market value of non-tradable shares, and the results are 
statistically similar.
5. Government Control, Investment Eﬃciency, and Agency Problems
In Section 4, the empirical analyses consistently show that investment and 
uncertainty are negatively related, and that government control weakens this relation. 
However, a question yet to be answered is whether the investment preference due to 
government control is efficient. In fact, it is difficult to directly measure investment 
eﬃciency. Studies typically test investment eﬃciency indirectly by examining whether 
investment is supported by opportunities (eg, Lang, Ofek, and Stulz, 1996). If 
incremental investment can bring marginal returns (ie, investment opportunities 
are supported), then new investment is efficient; otherwise, it is inefficient, or 
overinvestment.12 Therefore, we divide the sample firms into two groups based on 
12 Of course, there are two types of ineﬃcient investment, overinvestment and underinvestment. However, we 
cannot observe which one dominates. Some studies use the residuals of investment regression to identify 
overinvestment and underinvestment (eg, Richardson, 2006). However, this approach relies on an assumption 
that may not be established, namely, that on average, ﬁrms invest at the optimal level. Put another way, on 
average, there is neither overinvestment nor underinvestment. This obviously cannot be veriﬁed. Therefore, this 
paper tries to establish only whether overinvestment exists.
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growth opportunities: greater (Qs greater than the median Q; the high-Q group) and 
fewer (Qs lower than the median Q; the low-Q group). We then investigate whether 
investment preference due to government control differs between the two kinds of 
companies. The results are shown in Table 8.
Table 8. Regression Results for Government Control, Uncertainty, and Investment among the 
High-Q and Low-Q Samples
Dependent 
variable: I/K High Q Low Q
Dependent 
variable: I/K High Q Low Q
UC -0.382 -0.282 UC -0.359 -0.338
(-2.31**) (-1.92*) (-2.15**) (-2.37**)
Gov -0.091 -0.202 State -0.154 -0.360
(-1.24) (-3.04***) (-1.07) (-3.19***)
Gov*UC 0.196 0.432 State*UC 0.299 0.964
(1.62) (4.01***) (1.20) (4.49***)
Q 0.067 0.439 Q 0.067 0.423
(3.57***) (4.54***) (3.54***) (4.42***)
CF/K 0.009 0.065 CF/K 0.009 0.068
(0.18) (1.57) (0.18) (1.64)
(CF/K)2 0.339 0.336 (CF/K)
2 0.338 0.338
(6.12***) (5.00***) (6.13***) (5.04***)
LEV -0.323 -0.776 LEV -0.324 -0.782
(-5.09***) (-6.49***) (-5.11***) (-6.58***)
Cons 0.453 0.167 Cons 0.450 0.169
(4.55***) (1.15) (4.45***) (1.18)
Year Eﬀects Yes Yes Year Eﬀects Yes Yes
R2 0.1246 0.1694 R2 0.1241 0.1727
No. of Obs. 2,703 2,703 No. of Obs. 2,703 2,703
No. of Firms 641 619 No. of Firms 641 619
F-Statistics 8.75 12.92 F-Statistics 8.75 13.15
Note: The dependent variable is the investment level (I/K). The independent variables are UC, Gov (State), Gov*UC (State*UC), 
Q, CF/K, (CF/K)2, and LEV. UC is total ﬁrm uncertainty, measured as the annualized standard deviation of daily 
stock returns. Gov is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the listed company is controlled by the government, and 
zero otherwise. State is the proportion of state-owned shares. Q is the beginning Tobin’s Q, which is the market value of 
tradable shares plus the book value of non-tradable shares and total liabilities, divided by the book value of total assets. 
CF/K is the ratio of the current operating cash ﬂow to beginning capital assets. LEV is the beginning debt-to-asset ratio. 
The regression equation contains ﬁrm and year ﬁxed eﬀects, and Cons is the mean of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. R2 is R2-within 
from the ﬁxed eﬀects panel data regression. The T-values calculated using the robust standard errors adjusted for the 
cluster of ﬁrms are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.
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As Table 8 shows, in the high-Q group, although the interaction terms of 
government control and total ﬁrm uncertainty (Gov*UC and State*UC) are positive, 
they are not statistically signiﬁcant. In contrast, in the low-Q group, the two interaction 
terms are both signiﬁcantly positive and the coeﬃcients are even greater than those of 
total ﬁrm uncertainty. Hence, the investment preference due to government control is 
more common among companies with fewer growth opportunities, indicating that the 
investment preference of SOE managers is ineﬃcient. The administrative intervention 
and agency problems associated with government control may be the main reasons for 
the irrational investment preferences of government-controlled listed companies.
An agency problem arising from imperfect governance is risk shifting, or assets 
substitution. Eisdorfer (2008) found that because of risk shifting, ﬁrms facing ﬁnancial 
distress will plan to invest in high-risk projects, to damage the interests of creditors, 
and that risk taking makes the negative relation between investment and uncertainty 
nonsigniﬁcant, or even makes the relation positive. We predict that this phenomenon 
also exists in China’s listed companies. In addition, because of administrative 
intervention and poor corporate governance resulting from government control, we 
expect that SOE managers are more likely to shift risk than are their counterparts in 
private firms. To investigate the above predictions, we calculate the Altman Z-score 
(Altman, 1968) at the end of the previous year, and define those companies with a 
Z-score under 1.80 as financially distressed.13 We then repeat the tests of model (2) 
for ﬁnancially healthy and ﬁnancially distressed companies. The results are reported in 
Table 9.
Table 9. Regression Results for Government Control, Uncertainty, and Investment among 
Financially Healthy and Financially Distressed Companies
Dependent 
variable: I/K
Financially Healthy 
Companies
Financially 
Distressed 
Companies
Dependent 
variable: I/K
Financially 
Healthy 
Companies
Financially 
Distressed 
Companies
UC -0.336 -0.198 UC -0.371 -0.171
(-2.22**) (-1.33) (-2.42**) (-1.19)
Gov -0.051 -0.218 State -0.148 -0.352
(-0.76) (-2.77***) (-1.17) (-2.34**)
Gov*UC 0.191 0.343 State*UC 0.446 0.601
(1.70*) (2.78***) (1.93*) (2.30**)
Q 0.061 0.104 Q 0.060 0.106
(3.00***) (3.36***) (2.96***) (3.44***)
13 The formula to calculate the Altman Z-score at the end of the previous year is: Z = 1.2 * (Working Capital/
Book Value of Total Assets) + 1.4 * (Retained Earnings/Book Value of Total Assets) + 3.3 * (Earnings before 
Interest and Tax [EBIT]/Book Value of Total Assets) + 0.6 * (Market Capitalization/Total Liabilities) + 0.999 * 
(Revenues/Book Value of Total Assets).
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CF/K 0.004 0.137 CF/K 0.005 0.140
(0.10) (3.07***) (0.12) (3.13***)
(CF/K)2 0.335 0.248 (CF/K)
2 0.333 0.247
(6.82***) (3.73***) (6.80***) (3.73***)
LEV -0.436 -0.313 LEV -0.436 -0.315
(-3.98***) (-3.80***) (-3.96***) (-3.82***)
Cons 0.464 0.404 Cons 0.484 0.373
(4.78***) (3.79***) (4.88***) (3.52***)
Year Eﬀects Yes Yes Year Eﬀects Yes Yes
R2 0.1070 0.1478 R2 0.1072 0.1461
No. of Obs. 3,562 1,788 No. of Obs. 3,562 1,788
No. of Firms 639 450 No. of Firms 639 450
F-Statistics 8.70 6.51 F-Statistics 8.83 6.22
Note: The dependent variable is the investment level (I/K). The independent variables are UC, Gov (State), Gov*UC (State*UC), 
Q, CF/K, (CF/K)2, and LEV. UC is total ﬁrm uncertainty, measured as the annualized standard deviation of daily 
stock returns. Gov is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the listed company is controlled by the government, and 
zero otherwise. State is the proportion of state-owned shares. Q is the beginning Tobin’s Q, which is the market value of 
tradable shares plus the book value of non-tradable shares and total liabilities, divided by the book value of total assets. 
CF/K is the ratio of the current year operating cash ﬂow to beginning capital assets. LEV is the beginning debt-to-asset 
ratio. The regression equation contains ﬁrm and year ﬁxed eﬀects, and Cons is the mean of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. R2 is R2-
within from the ﬁxed eﬀects panel data regression. The T-values calculated using the robust standard errors adjusted for 
the cluster of ﬁrms are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.
In Table 9, the regression results of investment and total firm uncertainty for 
financially healthy companies are consistent with those reported in Table 5, except 
that the coefficient of the interaction term of government control and total firm 
uncertainty has a lower signiﬁcance level. However, the regression coeﬃcient of total 
ﬁrm uncertainty for ﬁnancially distressed companies is no longer signiﬁcant, indicating 
that ﬁrms facing ﬁnancial distress will not reduce the level of their investment under 
increasing uncertainty, consistent with risk-shifting theory. For financially distressed 
companies, the coeﬃcient of the interaction term of government control and total ﬁrm 
uncertainty is signiﬁcantly positive and much greater than that of total ﬁrm uncertainty 
itself, indicating that the risk-shifting problem is much more serious in government-
controlled listed companies.
6. Conclusion
This study empirically investigates the relation between investment and uncertainty. 
We ﬁnd that among China’s listed companies, as predicted based on real options theory, 
investment and uncertainty are negatively related. However, the relation between 
investment and uncertainty diﬀers between government- and privately controlled listed 
companies. Among the former, investment is not sensitive to total firm uncertainty. 
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The main reason is that government-controlled listed companies have a stronger risk 
preference because of administrative intervention, weak corporate governance, and 
the lack of an effective incentive system. We decompose total firm uncertainty into 
firm-specific, industry, and market uncertainty according to the CAPM, and regress 
investment on each of the three variables. We ﬁnd that government control makes the 
negative relation between investment and ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty nonsigniﬁcant and 
the relation between market uncertainty and investment positive. We also find that 
risk preference due to government control is greater among ﬁrms with fewer growth 
opportunities. Therefore, the risk taking of government-controlled ﬁrms is the result of 
ineﬃcient investment decision making rather than a rational decision. Finally, because of 
risk shifting, the negative relation between investment and uncertainty no longer holds 
in ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms but holds in government-controlled listed companies. Our 
research shows that China’s state economy is still ineﬃcient in some aspects. Reducing 
administrative intervention and overcoming the inherent agency problems of state 
ownership are still important tasks in the management of the state economy.
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